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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, an 
order of restitution in a criminal case may not include 
losses caused by conduct that falls outside the temporal 
limits established by a guilty plea. Because the District 
Court added restitution for fraudulent conduct that 
occurred before the date of the offense as established in the 
plea agreement and colloquy, we will remand for a 
reduction of the amount assessed. 
 
After pleading guilty to an Information charging her with 
a conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, defendant Taiwo 
Adeshola Akande was sentenced to 15 months 
imprisonment and directed to pay restitution of $83,137. 
Acting in concert with two others, she had used stolen or 
altered credit cards to obtain cash advances and 
merchandise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1029(a)(2) and 18 
U.S.C. S 1029(b)(2).1 The alleged conspiracy, according to 
the Information, took place from "on or about December 31, 
1997 to on or about July 8, 1998." 
 
Defendant reached a plea agreement in a letter from the 
United States Attorney on August 25, 1998. On that same 
day, she filed an Application for Permission to Enter Plea of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statute reaches anyone who "knowingly and with intent to defraud 
traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any 
one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value 
aggregating $1,000 or more during that period; . . . if the offense 
affects 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." 18 U.S.C.S 1029(a)(2). Defendant 
was liable as a co-conspirator under a separate provision in the statute. 
Id. S 1029(b)(2). 
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Guilty, which also contained a Waiver of Indictment. In that 
document, she stated that "[t]he substance of the plea 
agreement is: Guilty Plea to 1 count information charging a 
conspiracy . . . from 12/31/97 to 7/8/98." 
 
In the Presentence Report, the probation officer 
calculated the victims' losses at $83,137. This sum 
included two instances of fraud predating December 31, 
1997: a cash advance of $2,900 on November 27, 1997, 
and another transaction for $11,200 negotiated on 
November 20, 1997. At sentencing, defendant objected to 
the inclusion of those two events and pointed out that she 
pleaded guilty only to conduct occurring on or after 
December 31, 1997. The government countered that she or 
her cohorts had been involved in both incidents. The 
District Court included both items in its restitution order, 
stating that the disputed transactions "were part of the 
conspiracy charged in these cases." 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that restitution is due 
only for conduct occurring on or after December 31, 1997. 
The government asserts that the District Court was correct 
because the activity was part of the charged conspiracy, 
and the relevant statutes permit courts to order restitution 
for conduct not included in the Information. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the determination that 
restitution was lawful, and review the amount awarded for 
clear error. United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 795 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
We begin with the firmly established principle that federal 
courts may not order restitution in the absence of statutory 
authorization. United States v. Hensley, 91 F.3d 274, 276 
(1st Cir. 1996); United States v. DeSalvo, 41 F.3d 505, 511 
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 
1177 (2d Cir. 1989). The history of the pertinent statutes, 
past and present, reveals that this authorization is limited 
to the "offense of conviction." The Federal Probation Act of 
1948 permitted a sentencing judge to order restitution for 
"loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had." 
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, S 3651, 62 Stat. 683, 842 
(1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. S 3651 and repealed 1984). 
Similarly, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 
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also tied restitution to the offense of conviction, stating that 
a court, "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an 
offense under this title . . . , may order . . . restitution to 
any victim of the offense." Pub. L. No. 97-291, S 5(a), 96 
Stat. 1248, 1253 (1982) (codified at 18 U.S.C. S 3579(a)(1) 
and recodified and amended as 18 U.S.C. S 3663). 
 
In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (Hughey 
I), the defendant pleaded guilty to one count in exchange 
for dismissal of all other charges. He did not admit to any 
conduct beyond the count of conviction. The sentencing 
court nevertheless ordered him to pay restitution for the 
additional losses attributable to the dismissed counts. 
 
The Supreme Court, focusing on the language of 18 
U.S.C. S 3579, held that the statute "link[ed] restitution to 
the offense of conviction." Id. at 416. Had Congress 
intended otherwise, it "would likely have chosen language 
other than `the offense,' which refers without question to 
the offense of conviction." Id. at 418. Accordingly, 
restitution was allowable "only for the loss caused by the 
specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of 
conviction." Id. at 413. 
 
The Court acknowledged that a plea agreement may 
operate to limit the acts for which restitution might be 
ordered, but pointed out that "[t]he essence of a plea 
agreement is that [both sides] make concessions to avoid 
potential losses." Id. at 421. The government's argument for 
greater breadth of the restitution order was thus rejected in 
favor of a narrow construction of the statute. Further, even 
were the text ambiguous, "longstanding principles of lenity" 
dictated that the statute be read in the defendant's favor. 
Id. at 422. The Court therefore concluded that restitution to 
victims other than those of the count of conviction was 
invalid. Id. 
 
In United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1421 (3d 
Cir. 1992), we followed Hughey I's admonition "that the 
count of conviction controls the amount of restitution." 
Accordingly, we instructed the District Court on remand to 
"focus on the counts to which pleas are entered" in order to 
determine the restitutionary amount. Id. at 1423. 
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Soon after the Hughey I decision, Congress acted to 
enlarge the set of "victims" to whom restitution could be 
granted. The Victim and Witness Protection Act was 
amended to provide that "a victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern 
of criminal activity means any person directly harmed by 
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." Crime Control Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. XXV, S 2509, 104 Stat. 4789, 4863 
(1990) (amending 18 U.S.C. S 3663). 
 
As we noted in United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 70 (3d 
Cir. 1996), the amendment augmented the authority of the 
District Courts beyond that permitted by Hughey I. This 
expansion, however, "is not so broad that it permits a 
district court to order restitution to anyone harmed by any 
activity of the defendant related to the scheme, conspiracy 
or pattern." Id. The victim's harm must be closely 
connected to the conspiracy or scheme rather than merely 
tangentially. Id. 
 
As Kones pointed out, Congress intended that restitution 
was to be "readily determined by the sentencing judge 
based upon the evidence" produced during trial or in the 
course of plea proceedings. Id. at 69. In short, Kones 
followed Hughey I's approach in applying a narrow reading 
of the restitution statute. 
 
Mr. Hughey's contribution to the law of restitution did 
not end with the Supreme Court's opinion. He again 
engaged in criminal activities that ultimately came to the 
attention of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(Hughey II). Following his conviction -- this time for bank 
fraud -- his order of restitution included losses from 
offenses committed before the date set out in the 
indictment. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the district judge could 
award restitution only for "the conduct made the basis of 
[the defendant's] conviction." Id. at 438. Acknowledging the 
enactment of the 1990 amendments, the Court nevertheless 
reaffirmed that Hughey I's limitation of the award to losses 
within the scope of the offense "still stands." Id. at 437. The 
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reliance upon the temporal limits of the indictment in 
Hughey II is thus consistent with the admonition in Hughey 
I that restitution must be linked directly to the offense of 
conviction. 
 
The statute in effect at the time of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663A,2 was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 3663A, entitled "Mandatory restitution to victims of certain 
crimes," states in relevant part: 
 
       (a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,  when sentencing 
       a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), 
the 
       court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, 
       in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, 
that 
       the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if 
the 
       victim is deceased, to the victim's estate. 
 
       (2) For the purposes of this section, the term"victim" means a 
       person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the 
       commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered 
       including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a 
       scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person 
       directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course 
of 
       the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (c)(1) This section shall apply in all sentencing proceedings for 
       convictions of, or plea agreements relating to charges for, any 
       offense-- 
 
       (A) that is-- 
 
        (i) a crime of violence, as defined in secti on 16; 
 
        (ii) an offense against property under this ti tle, including any 
       offense committed by fraud or deceit; or 
 
        (iii) an offense described in section 1365 (re lating to tampering 
       with consumer products); and 
 
       (B) in which an identifiable victim or victims h as suffered a 
       physical injury or pecuniary loss. 
 
       (2) In the case of a plea agreement that does not result in a 
       conviction for an offense described in paragraph (1), this section 
       shall apply only if the plea specifically states that an offense 
listed 
       under such paragraph gave rise to the plea agreement. 
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. II, subtit. 
A, S 204(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1227-29 (1996). Unlike its 
companion provision at 18 U.S.C. S 3663, this section 
mandates restitution for certain crimes, such as property 
offenses committed by fraud or deceit. 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663A(c)(1). 
 
The statute provides that a court "shall order . . . that the 
defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense." Id. 
S 3663A(a)(1). The term "victim" means"a person directly 
and proximately harmed . . . including, in the case of an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, 
or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed 
by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." Id.S 3663A(a)(2). The court 
shall also order restitution as provided in a plea agreement, 
even to "persons other than the victim of the offense." Id. 
S 3663A(a)(3).3 
 
The critical references in the statutory text are to"victim 
of the offense" and to "an offense that involves as an 
element a . . . conspiracy, . . . any person directly harmed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (3) This section shall not apply in the case of an  offense 
described 
       in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) if the court finds, from facts on the 
record, 
       that-- 
 
       (A) the number of identifiable victims is so lar ge as to make 
       restitution impracticable; or 
 
       (B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or 
       amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the 
       sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution 
       to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing 
       process. 
 
3. Restitution is limited to amounts "directly caused by the conduct 
composing the offense of conviction," or those amounts that defendant 
"expressly agree[s] to" pursuant to the plea agreement. United States v. 
Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, the plea agreement 
merely indicates that the sentencing judge "will order [defendant] to pay 
restitution." It does not specify any victims or amounts. Thus, the scope 
of restitution must be found by looking to the authority granted by the 
statute. 
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by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the 
. . . conspiracy." The issue here is how this language, 
virtually identical to the corresponding portions of section 
3663, is to be construed. Accordingly, we look to the case 
law that construes either section 3663 or 3663A. 
 
In addition to Hughey II, other opinions have also 
discussed temporal concerns. In DeSalvo, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit read an indictment's temporal 
limits narrowly, to prevent "vague allegations" from 
supporting restitution "based upon broad, unsubstantiated 
conduct." 41 F.3d at 515 (internal quotes omitted). In 
United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1995), 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 
dates specified in the indictment, together with a 
description of the unlawful conduct, was "specific enough 
to satisfy" Hughey I. Other courts have held to the same 
effect. See, e.g., Hensley, 91 F.3d at 277-78 (looking to 
"duration" and "timing" of the offense of conviction); United 
States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 1994) (losses 
"directly caused by conduct within the temporal limits of 
the offense of conviction"); United States v. Hayes, 32 F.3d 
171, 173 (5th Cir. 1994) (no restitution for losses incurred 
in period before date of offense of conviction); United States 
v. Langer, 962 F.2d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (indictment 
described "specific dates"). 
 
Even in cases where temporal matters were not at issue, 
courts have held that a defendant may not be ordered to 
pay restitution for losses unrelated to the acts for which he 
was convicted. United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 686 
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Henoud, 81 F.3d 484, 488 
(4th Cir. 1996). The conduct underlying the offense of 
conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the 
restitutionary authority. 
 
In sum, the "offense of conviction," as defined by Hughey 
I, remains the reference point for classifying conduct that 
determines liability for restitution. Although the 
amendment expanded the breadth of the definition of 
victims, the text did not extend the length of the period 
attributable to the offense of conviction. We therefore find 
ourselves in agreement with the Hughey II Court that the 
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offense of conviction is temporally defined by the period 
specified in the indictment or information. 
 
The government suggests that even if the defendant's 
conduct is not within the scope of the offense as described 
by Hughey I, the conduct challenged here is within the 
ambit of the 1990 amendments. That argument misses the 
mark. The amendment enlarged the group of victims who 
would be entitled to restitution, but the triggering event -- 
the offense of conviction -- remains the same. United States 
v. Welsand, 23 F.3d 205, 207 (8th Cir. 1994) (the 
amendment "does not explicitly extend the contours of the 
word `offense' "). 
 
Although victims need not be specifically named in the 
indictment or at trial, their harm must still be directly and 
proximately caused by the criminal conduct that is 
established by the prosecution. As the 1990 House Report 
made clear, restitution was authorized only for"a victim of 
the offense for which the defendant has been convicted." 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-681(I), at 177, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6583. As stated in a later Senate Report 
accompanying the enactment of section 3663A, restitution 
is to be ordered where the loss was "directly and 
proximately caused by the course of conduct under the 
count or counts for which the offender is convicted." Sen. 
Rep. No. 104-179, at 19, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
924, 932. Congress did not want sentencing to become a 
forum for determination of issues better suited to civil 
proceedings. Id. at 18, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 
931. 
 
Trying another tack, the government notes that the 
Information used the phrase "on or about" in setting out 
the time when the conspiracy commenced. According to 
this theory, inserting the qualification stretches the edges of 
the Information timeline so that it encompasses the two 
transactions in question. We recognize that in other 
settings, some variance in proof at trial from the date stated 
in an indictment has been permitted where qualified by a 
phrase such as "on or about." United States v. Somers, 496 
F.2d 723, 743-46 (3d Cir. 1974). But even in those 
situations, such variances may not be allowed to the 
defendant's actual prejudice. Id. at 744 (citing Berger v. 
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United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), and Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)). Cf. United States v. Critchley, 
353 F.2d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1965). 
 
Further, although the government cites opinions giving 
an expansive scope to the amorphous qualifier"on or 
about," these cases generally involve attacks on the 
sufficiency of the evidence or indictment, and not 
challenges to restitution. See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 
189 F.3d 1251, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 
Because the government "has control over the drafting" of 
the Information, it bears the burden of "includ[ing] 
language sufficient to cover all acts for which it will seek 
restitution." DeSalvo, 41 F.3d at 514. Here, the prosecution 
offers "no justification for its failure to specifically allege" 
the November incidents in the Information, nor 
demonstrates that the phrase "on or about" evinces an 
intent to cover such conduct. Id. Whatever might be the 
result in cases where the events were closer in time than a 
month, under the circumstances now before us, we are not 
persuaded by the "on or about" argument. 
 
We are therefore left with the question of what was the 
"offense of conviction." Because the conviction here was the 
result of a plea bargain rather than the product of a jury 
verdict, we look to the plea agreement and colloquy. United 
States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1148 (4th Cir. 
1995); Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 689. 
 
The plea agreement contains a merger clause, but 
nothing there indicates that the "on or about" language in 
the Information extends so far back as to embrace the 
November incidents. In the document filed with the District 
Court on the same day as the plea agreement, defendant 
stated that "the substance" of the charge and plea 
agreement was for a conspiracy "from 12/31/97 to 
7/8/98." Nowhere in this document, a supplement to the 
plea colloquy, did she admit to any criminal conduct 
occurring before December 31, 1997. 
 
In addressing defendant at the plea colloquy, the district 
judge asked the following questions, in order "for the court 
to trace the facts to see that they meet the essential 
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elements of the offense charged in the Information." 
Defendant answered all queries in the affirmative. 
 
       - "In late 1997, did you agree with [co-defendants] 
       that the three of you would use stolen credit card 
       account numbers . . . to obtain cash advances and 
       merchandise to which none of you were entitled?" 
 
       - "On or about December 31, 1997, did you obtain 
       the stolen . . . credit card in the name of Mary 
       Breusch?" 
 
       - "On or before December 31, 1997, did you also 
       obtain a fraudulent New Jersey driver's license in 
       the name of Mary Breusch . . . ?" 
 
       - "On or about December 31, 1997, did you use the 
       stolen Mary Breusch credit card along with the . . . 
       license to obtain two cash advances . . . one at . .. 
       Fleet Bank . . . the other at Corestates Bank . . . ?" 
 
       - "On or about January 7, 1998, did you go to Bailey, 
       Banks and Biddle . . . ?" 
 
       - "Did you [and co-defendants] use various stolen 
       credit cards and matching identification documents 
       to obtain other cash advances and merchandise?" 
 
The earliest specific date mentioned during these 
exchanges was more than a month after the November 
incidents. The district judge's only other temporal 
references, to "on or about," "on or before," and "late 1997," 
are too vague in the context of restitution. "[A] defendant 
cannot enter a voluntary and knowing plea to a specific 
offense of conviction at the time of the plea allocution and 
then wait to have the offense of conviction determined 
afterwards at sentencing." Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 690 n.2. 
 
These exchanges, in short, do not meet the test of 
specificity necessary to stretch the offense of conviction 
from December 31, 1997, as stated in the Information, as 
far back as November 20 and 27, 1997. The government 
framed the Information to charge conduct that began on 
December 31, 1997, and it is bound by its choice to do so. 
 
Trying to broaden the conspiracy, the government points 
toward facts that show ties between the November incidents 
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and the December activity. The prosecution suggests that 
these facts show that the conspiracy embraced these earlier 
events. Although those incidents might be relevant for other 
sentencing purposes under the Guidelines, restitution is 
determined only by statutory provisions, such as 18 U.S.C. 
SS 3663 and 3663A. U.S.S.G. S 5E1.1(a)(1). 
 
Although judges normally may use any information they 
possess to enhance a sentence, "restitution is a special 
case," because the statutes limit restitution to the losses 
caused by the offense of conviction. United States v. Kane, 
944 F.2d 1406, 1415 n.7 (7th Cir. 1991); see also 
Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 688 ("different considerations" govern 
the scope of conduct relevant to restitution, in contrast to 
the scope of the relevant conduct provision in the 
Guidelines). Accordingly, because we look only to the 
"specific conduct" supporting the offense of conviction, the 
mere fact that the November events may be "factua[lly] 
connect[ed]" to the later conspiracy does not make them 
legally relevant. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d at 1148-49; see 
also United States v. Jewett, 978 F.2d 248, 252 (6th Cir. 
1992) ("Acts other than [those] described in a count of 
conviction, even when committed during the course of or in 
furtherance of the same fraudulent scheme, do not state 
independent `offenses of conviction.' "). 
 
The government had the opportunity to amend the 
Information to include the November 1997 incidents. See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e). Because those events were not 
mentioned in the Information or during the plea colloquy, 
they may not be considered after the fact to be part of the 
defendant's offense of conviction. Kones, 77 F.3d at 69. In 
light of all these circumstances, the restitution order 
should not have included the sum of $14,100 for the two 
November 1997 incidents. 
 
Accordingly, this case will be remanded for appropriate 
modification of the order of restitution. In all other respects, 
the judgment of the District Court will remain undisturbed. 
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